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Father’s (Jones) Day: Gender Stereotyping in Discriminatory Paid Parental Leave Policies 
Franziska Mangot* 
I. Introduction 
Julia Sheketoff and Mark Savignac married after they met while clerking for Justice Breyer in 
the United States Supreme Court.1  After clerking for the Supreme Court, both Julia and Mark 
went on to work in Jones Day’s Issues and Appeals group in Washington, D.C.2  Julia worked for 
Jones Day from 2014 to 2018 when she left the firm to become an appellate public defender3 and 
Mark from 2017 to 2019, when he was fired.4  Jones Day allegedly fired Mark for expressing his 
disagreement with, what he claimed to be, the firm’s discriminatory parental leave policy. 5  
Following Mark’s termination—an allegedly retaliatory act on behalf of Jones Day—Julia and 
Mark filed a complaint against the firm on August 13, 2019,6 potentially exposing other employers 
offering paid family leave to liability. 
The complaint describes Jones Day’s parental leave policy, which provides eighteen weeks of 
paid leave for new biological mothers but only ten weeks of paid leave for new biological fathers.7  
In addition, the policy provides adoptive parents, who are primary caregivers, with eighteen weeks 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., University of Rochester.  I would especially like 
to thank my faculty advisor, Professor Charles Sullivan, for his exceptional guidance throughout the process of 
writing this Comment.  His time and effort spent reviewing my work is greatly appreciated.  I would also like to 
thank Shannon Finnegan, my Comments Editor, for her time, effort, and valuable feedback. 
1 Jason Knot, Luxury or Liability? Jones Day and the Thorny Issue of Parental Leave, THE NATIONAL LAW 





2 Id.  
3 Complaint at 18, Savignac v. Jones Day (D.D.C. 2019) (No. 1:19-cv-02443) [hereinafter Jones Day Complaint]. 
4 Id. at 3. 
5 Id.  
6 Id. at 1. 
7 Id. at 13. 
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of paid leave.8  Both male and female primary caregivers may request an additional six weeks of 
unpaid leave; however, Julia and Mark allege that the firm favors such requests from female 
employees.9   Jones Day labels the additional eight weeks that biological mothers receive as 
“disability” leave.10  Yet mothers are granted eight weeks of “disability” regardless of whether or 
not they are actually disabled.11   
Before departing the firm, Julia sent an e-mail regarding the parental leave policy and requested 
that her husband Mark be given the full eighteen weeks paid leave since the couple decided he 
would be the primary caregiver.12  Her e-mail stated:  
Eight of the weeks for women are labeled as disability leave, but the leave is not dependent 
upon whether women are actually disabled. Most women aren’t physically disabled from 
office work for such a long period and yet still get the full eight weeks of disability leave . . . 
That seems to reflect the traditional notion that women should bear most of the burden of 
childcare, which strikes me as unfairly discriminatory.13  
  
She continued, “For me, since Mark will be the primary caregiver, this will have a pretty big impact 
on my life, because I’ll end up staying out of work for the extra eight weeks that Mark cannot. For 
career reasons, I’d rather not do that.”14 
Jones Day rejected Julia’s plea for equal treatment of her husband in a phone call from the 
Director of Human Resources.15  On the phone, the Director allegedly acknowledged that the 
policy does grant women the additional eight weeks regardless of whether or not they are 
disabled.16  The complaint stated: “there is no legitimate basis for giving new mothers more time 
than new fathers to care for and bond with their children . . . nor for giving sex-based disability 
 
8 Id. 
9 Jones Day Complaint at 14. 
10 Id. at 14. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 18. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Jones Day Complaint at 19. 
16 Id. at 19. 
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leave to employees who are not disabled.”17  In Counts I and III of the complaint, Mark and Julia 
asserted that Jones Day violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,18 and the D.C. Human 
Rights Act, D.C. Code § 2-140, because the parental leave policy discriminates on the basis of sex 
when it provides female employees with an additional eight weeks of paid leave in contrast to male 
employees to “care for and bond with their new children.”19  In Count II, Mark and Julia asserted 
Jones Day violated the Equal Pay Act of 1963,20 by paying female primary caregivers for eighteen 
weeks of leave, but only ten weeks for male primary caregivers.21 
The Jones Day case presents relevant and forthcoming issues.  If the plaintiffs prevail, the 
outcome of the litigation may expose employers with similar paid parental leave policies to 
complaints or possible class actions.  Several other big law firms have paid parental leave policies 
like the one under fire in the case against Jones Day, including Cravath, Swaine & Moore; Cleary 
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton; and Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher.22  For example, Gibson Dunn’s website 
states: “For the birth of a child, our women lawyers are entitled to up to eighteen weeks of paid maternity 
leave, and male lawyers are entitled to up to ten weeks of paid paternity leave.”23  Arnold & Porter’s 
website states: “The Firm policies provide for a total of 18 weeks of paid leave for the primary 
caregiver of an adopted child or for a woman who gives birth to a child. Secondary caregivers for 
a newly adopted child or for a newborn child are eligible for six weeks of paid Secondary Caregiver 
Leave.”24   
 
17 Id. at 17. 
18 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2018). 
19 Jones Day Complaint at 25. 
20 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2018). 
21 Jones Day Complaint at 26. 
22 Dan Packel, Jones Day Parental Leave Bias Suit Likely to Reverberate, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (Aug. 16, 2019), 
https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2019/08/16/jones-day-parental-leave-bias-suit-likely-to-reverberate/.  
23 Gibson Dunn, Women of Gibson Dunn, https://www.gibsondunn.com/diversity/women-of-gibson-dunn/ (last visited Sept. 7, 
2019). 
24 Arnold & Porter, Work/Life Programs, https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/careers/professional-staff/worklife-
programs (last visited Sept. 9, 2019).  
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Some firms are eliminating the distinction between primary and secondary caregivers, instead 
offering equal paid leave to all parents.25  Examples include Foley Hoag and Munger, Tolles & 
Olsen.26  Other firms provide equal paid leave to both parents, with the option for women who 
give birth to take about eight to ten weeks for disability leave on an as-needed basis.27  Although 
there are instances of firms providing equal paid leave for both genders, of the 118 recorded firms 
on Chambers Associate, only thirteen provide equal paid leave for primary and secondary 
caregivers.28  This comment argues that, to avoid liability and promote equality, employers should 
craft their paid parental leave policies as not to distinguish between primary and secondary 
caregivers and remain gender neutral.  The policies should provide equal leave for all genders and 
medical disability upon the demonstration of need for women who suffer from pregnancy-related 
medical conditions.  Although providing females with heightened or preferential disability benefits 
due to pregnancy is permitted based on case law, employers should be cautious in doing so to 
avoid exposure to liability.29 
Part II is a broad overview of the importance of the topic.  Part III will discuss the development 
of gender stereotyping as a basis for discrimination under equal protection and how that framework 
was adopted in Title VII jurisprudence.  Part IV will briefly highlight the unique challenge male 
plaintiffs face in demonstrating discrimination for failure to conform to a gender role, since male 
gender roles are less visible in the employment context and courts are reluctant to interrupt the 
status quo.  Part V will discuss how gender stereotyping was adopted into the FMLA framework.  
 
25 Packel, supra note 22.  
26 Id. 
27 Id. (Examples of firms giving women eight to ten weeks for disability leave in addition to parental leave provided 
for both men and women are Dechert, Paul Hastings and Sidley Austin).  
28 Chambers Associate (last visited Sept. 7, 2019, 4:31 PM), http://www.chambers-associate.com/law-
firms/worklife-and-benefits.  
29 See infra Section VII.  It is worth noting that many of these suits may plead state claims in addition to any federal 
ones, which could potentially lead to different outcomes.  Additional state claims are outside the scope of this 
Comment.  
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Part VI will discuss the EEOC Enforcement Guidelines Regarding Caregiver Discrimination, 
which reflects its position on gender stereotyping.  Part VII will discuss parental leave cases 
including California Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Guerra30 and Johnson v. Univ. of Iowa,31 
as well as settlements involving Esteé Lauder and JP Morgan.  Part VIII will briefly conclude the 
argument that male plaintiffs who challenge unequal paid parental leave policies should use the 
sex-based gender stereotyping framework in order to succeed. 
II. General Landscape of Paternity Leave Issues 
It is worth exploring this topic as there has been a 336 percent increase in paternity leave cases 
in the last decade.32  From 1996 to 2005, courts ruled on fourteen paternity leave cases, whereas 
courts ruled on sixty-one between 2006 and 2015.33  Although men who have brought caregiver 
discrimination actions have seen success in cases regarding employer retaliation against seeking 
male family leave, courts are less likely to remedy more complicated issues.34  More men are 
becoming caregivers,35 and more male caregivers are employed than their female counterparts.36  
This has led to an increase in cases brought by men arising from family issues in the employment 
arena.37  Paternity leave cases usually involve three core issues: males being denied paternity leave, 
males facing retaliation for taking paternity leave, and males receiving unequal leave compared to 
females.38  This comment will focus on the third category.   
 
30 479 U.S. 272 (1987). 
31 431 F.3d 325 (8th Cir. 2005). 
32 Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Caregivers in the Workplace, UC HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW 4 (2016), 
https://worklifelaw.org/publications/Caregivers-in-the-Workplace-FRD-update-2016.pdf.  
33 Andrew Keshner, More American Men Clamor for Paternity Leave: “A Father Shouldn’t Have to be Lucky to 
Bond with his Child,” MARKET WATCH (July 27, 2019, 4:29 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/more-
american-men-clamor-for-paternity-leave-a-father-shouldnt-have-to-be-lucky-to-form-a-bond-with-his-child-2019-
07-26. 
34 Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Men at Work, Fathers at Home: Uncovering the Masculine Face of Caregiver 
Discrimination, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 253, 257 (2013). 
35 Calvert, supra note 32, at 16.  
36 Calvert, supra note 32, at 16. 
37 Calvert, supra note 32, at 16. 
38 Calvert, supra note 32, at 16. 
 7 
III. From Equal Protection to Title VII: Developing Gender Stereotyping as Sex 
Discrimination 
This section will discuss the acceptance of gender stereotyping as a basis for sex discrimination 
claims—an argument that came into prominence in the 1970s when Justice Ginsburg persuaded 
the Supreme Court that writing gender stereotypes into the law violated equal protection.39  This 
section will then discuss how the gender-stereotyping-as-discrimination argument from the 1970s 
has been accepted in Title VII jurisprudence and how it can—and should—be applied to caregiver 
discrimination claims.   
Title VII covers an employer “engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or 
more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or 
preceding calendar year…” 40   Title VII prohibits sex discrimination, not caregiver 
discrimination.41  Individuals claiming discrimination must show they faced negative treatment 
based on a gender bias rather than on their status of being a caregiver.42  Employers are legally 
permitted to terminate an employee for his or her declining work performance following the birth 
of a child.43  An employee must demonstrate she was terminated based on a stereotype regarding 
her status as a parent rather than for her actual performance at work.44   
To establish a gender discrimination claim based on gender stereotypes, male caregivers must 
show that: (1) they have a male gender, (2) there are norms associated with that gender, and (3) 
their employer punished them for not following those norms.45  Men face greater workplace 
 
39 ACLU, Timeline of Major Supreme Court Decisions on Women’s Rights, 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/101917a-wrptimeline_0.pdf.  
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2018).  
41 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 34, at 261. 
42 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 34, at 261. 
43 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 34, at 261. 
44 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 34, at 261. 
45 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 34, at 299. 
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penalties for failing to adhere to the norm of breadwinner when they act in a non-competitive 
manner because they take on a greater role in family responsibilities and subordinate work-life.46  
At the same time, men find little sympathy in the courtroom, because workplace stereotypes are 
more visible for women; and judges are cautious about challenging the American “work-life 
balance,” which, ironically, puts work before family.47  Title VII case law establishes gender 
stereotyping theory, which means that employees who face backlash for departing from 
presumptions about how the employee should act based on the employee’s gender, have a valid 
cause of action.48  Although Title VII jurisprudence has developed to recognize sex discrimination 
against working mothers, it has failed to recognize it to the same extent for fathers.49 
Before Title VII jurisprudence adopted gender stereotyping into its framework, the framework 
was developed through equal protection claims under the Fifth Amendment.50  Justice Ginsburg 
developed arguments in the 1970s, later accepted by the Supreme Court, which resulted in sex-
based classifications being prohibited.51  Following the line of cases establishing this rule in the 
1970s, Title VII jurisprudence developed to recognize that sex discrimination occurs when an 
employee is mistreated for not conforming to gender roles.52  The Supreme Court’s analysis in the 
1970s equal protection cases should be used to support arguments against gender-stereotyping in 
parental leave policies.   
A. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld: A Child’s Interest in Parental Care 
 
46 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 34, at 299. 
47 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 34, at 299. 
48 Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family Conflicts of Men, 
63 HASTINGS L.J. 1297, 1300 (2011). 
49 Id. 
50 Bornstein, supra note 48 at, 1300. 
51 Bornstein, supra note 48 at, 1300. 
52 Bornstein, supra note 48 at, 1300. 
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Early equal protection cases challenged laws that were created around gender stereotypes.53  
Although constitutional cases do not reach conduct in the private employment sphere, analogous 
gender stereotyping arguments made in constitutional cases are often utilized in the private context.  
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld54 the challenged Social Security Act provision stated that the widow 
of a deceased man and their minor children were entitled to receive benefits based on his salary.55  
On the other hand, only the minor children of a deceased woman were entitled to the benefits of 
her salary, effectively excluding the widower.56  If the widow worked, her benefits would be 
reduced based on how much she was earning.57  In this case, Mrs. Wiesenfeld was the main wage-
earner for her family.58  When she died in childbirth leaving Mr. Wiesenfeld to care for their 
newborn son, he applied for survivor benefits.59  The social security office granted the couple’s 
son social security benefits, but denied them to Mr. Wiesenfeld because only women could receive 
survivor benefits.60   
The Supreme Court found that the law discriminated against women because it provided less 
protection for their families as opposed to males.61  The Court found the purpose of the law, as 
evidenced by the legislature’s intent, was to allow young widows to have the choice to stay at 
home and care for their children rather than work.62  Congress’s purpose for passing the law was 
 
53 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (challenging a law that required female military members 
to demonstrate spousal dependency for distributing benefits, but not imposing the same requirement on male 
military members).  
54 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
55 Id. at 637. 
56 Id. at 638. 
57 Id. at 641. 
58 Id. at 639. 
59 Id.  
60 Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 639–40.  
61 Id. at 638. 
62 Id. at 649. 
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the important interest of having a parent at home to care for minor children.63  This objective, the 
Court articulated, made the law’s different treatment between the genders “entirely irrational.”64 
The Court reasoned that it is important for a child to have a parent to care for her at home 
regardless of whether the surviving parent is male or female—the child’s interest in having a 
surviving parent to care for her remains the same. 65  Separate from the child’s interest in having a 
parent to care for her, fathers as well as mothers have “a constitutionally protected right to the 
‘companionship, care, custody, and management’ of ‘the children he has sired and raised, [which] 
undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.’”66  It is 
interesting that the Court’s analysis focused not only on the child’s right to the love and support 
of a surviving parent, but it highlighted the fact that a father, not just a mother, also has the right 
to care for and raise his children.67  
The same reasoning the Supreme Court used in Weinberger could be applied to paid parental 
leave policies.  A newborn child has an interest in bonding with his parents, regardless of whether 
that parent is male or female.  There is no sense in a parental leave policy that uses gender to 
determine the amount of time a parent is given to care for a newborn child, because a newborn 
child has an interest in being cared for by a parent for a certain amount of time, regardless of that 
parent’s gender.  In other words, a child’s interests does not change based on the gender of the 
parent staying home to care for him.  Additionally, as emphasized by the Court, a father also has 
an equal constitutional right to care for his child.68  
 
63 Id. at 651. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 652. 




Parental leave policies that automatically grant men less leave operate on assumptions that 
women are the primary caregivers, which also assumes that a woman cannot be a breadwinner 
while her husband assumes childcare responsibilities.  Such policies operate on the same 
stereotype that the Supreme Court criticized in Weinberger—that women would rather stay home 
and care for children than work, while men would not.69  If the Supreme Court rejected such 
stereotypes to justify unequal distribution of social security benefits in 1975, those same 
stereotypes should not be written into parental leave policies that determine the distribution of 
employment benefits in 2019.  Justice Ginsburg argued and the Supreme Court accepted “that 
denying the ability of a man to care for his children while supporting the ability of a woman to do 
so is sex discrimination” when such stereotypes are written into the law,70 and it should remain 
true in instances where the same stereotypes are written into policies that guide parental leave.   
B. Califano v. Goldfarb: Identifying Archaic Gender Stereotypes 
In Califano v. Goldfarb, the Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits 
Program (OASDI) was in dispute.71  Under the OASDI, widows received social security benefits 
that their husbands paid into throughout their career.72  On the other hand, a widower had to prove 
that he relied on his wife’s income for half of his support in order to obtain the same social security 
benefits.73  In short, a widower had to prove dependency on his wife to receive benefits, while 
widows had no such burden.74   
 
69 Id. at 652. (“Congress legislated on the presumption that women as a group would choose to forgo work to care 
for children while men would not…”) 
70 Bornstein, supra note 48, at 1312. 





In this case, Mrs. Goldfarb worked as a secretary in New York City for twenty-five years until 
she passed away.75  During her career she paid into social security.76  When Mrs. Goldfarb died, 
Mr. Goldfarb applied for and was denied social security benefits because he was unable to prove 
that at the time of his wife’s death she was supplying half of his support.77  Relying on Weinberger, 
the Supreme Court held that the “gender-based distinction” in the statute violated the equal 
protection clause of the Fifth Amendment.78  The Court reasoned that providing female employees 
with less protection for their families despite paying into social security the same way as men 
violated the Constitution.79  Such distinctions, according to the Court, were “supported by no more 
substantial justification than ‘archaic and overbroad’ generalizations, or ‘old notions,’ such as 
‘assumptions as to dependency,’ that are more consistent with ‘the role-typing society has long 
imposed,’ than with contemporary reality.”80   
As in Weinberger, the only reason the law implemented different standards for each gender 
was due to assumptions that females would be the dependent spouse and writing such gender 
stereotypes into the law would save the government time and money.81  The Court concluded that 
these stereotypes did not support discrimination in employment benefits.82  As mentioned above, 
although this line of cases addresses gender stereotypes as constitutional violations, the same 
reasoning should apply in the private context.  Parental leave policies that provide women with 
more time for childcare than men are based on the same “archaic” stereotypes the Supreme Court 
again criticized in Califano.83  Such policies operate on the generalizations that women are the 
 
75 Id. at 202–203. 
76 Id. at 203. 
77 Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 203. 
78 Id. at 204. 
79 Id. at 206–07. 
80 Id. at 207. 
81 Id. at 217. 
82 Id.  
83 Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 207. 
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caregivers and men the breadwinners.  Policies operating on those gender assumptions are outdated 
and discriminatory, just as they are when written into the law like in Califano and Weinberger. 
C. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: Title VII and Gender-Stereotyping 
Discrimination against an employee by a private employer for failing to conform to gender 
stereotypes is actionable sex discrimination under Title VII, just as such behavior is actionable 
under equal protection.84  In 1989, the Supreme Court extended gender stereotyping framework 
that the Court adopted in Califano and Weinberger to Title VII.85  In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
Hopkins was a manager at Price where a group of partners nominated her for partnership.86  The 
process required partners to submit comments for every proposed candidate.87  After reviewing all 
of the comments, the Admissions Committee made a recommendation to the firm to either accept, 
deny, or hold a candidate’s application.88  Hopkins was the only woman out of eighty-eight 
candidates for partnership.89  Her application was originally held and subsequently denied, and she 
then sued, alleging that the firm violated Title VII when it discriminated against her by denying 
her application for partner on the basis of her sex.90 
The Brennan plurality held that the burden was on the employee to show that gender was a 
motivating factor in the employer’s decision;91 at that point, the employer was liable unless it could 
show by the preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision absent the 
consideration of gender.92  The plurality concluded that Hopkins made the showing that her gender 
 
84 Bornstein, supra note 48, at 1315. 
85 Bornstein, supra note 48, at 1313. 




89 Id. at 233. 
90 Id. at 231. 
91 Id. at 241–42. 
92 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242. 
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played a role in Price’s decision not to make her a partner because the written and verbal comments 
made to Hopkins showed that she was penalized for not conforming to female gender-
stereotypes. 93   Some of the comments that were submitted suggested that Hopkins was too 
“macho,”94 and one partner told her that if she dressed more feminine she would have a better 
chance at becoming partner.95 
The plurality announced: 
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could 
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with 
their group, for ‘[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their 
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women resulting from sex stereotypes.’96   
 
Such reasoning supports the argument that parental leave policies based on stereotypes that 
men are less likely to want to be caregivers are discriminatory. 
In regard to the burden of proof, the Court stated “once a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows 
that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding 
of liability only by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed 
gender to play such a role.”97  (emphasis added).  Dissatisfied with this aspect of the Price 
Waterhouse plurality opinion, Congress increased employer liability with the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, which provides: 
[W]here the plaintiff shows that discrimination was a motivating factor for an employment 
decision, the employer is liable for injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, and costs (but not 
individual monetary or affirmative relief) even though it proves it would have made the same 
decision in the absence of a discriminatory motive.98   
 
93 Id. at 251. 
94 Id. at 235. 
95 Id. at 235. 
96 Id. at 251. 
97 Id. at 244–45.  Justice O’Connor concurred, agreeing with the burden of proof, but disagreeing with the actual rule 
regarding causation.  See id. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice White also concurred, agreeing with the 
allocation of the burden of proof, but disagreeing with the requirement of objective evidence.  See id. (White, J., 
concurring). 
98 EEOC, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/1990s/civilrights.html. 
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The implication of this change on a Title VII challenge to a discriminatory parental leave policy, 
is that once the plaintiff demonstrates that gender was a factor in structuring the policy, the 
employer would face liability even if it was able to prove that it would have structured the policy 
the same way even without considering gender.  The modifications by Civil Rights Act of 1991 
provide greater relief for plaintiffs in such cases.  Therefore, for example, even though an 
employer’s desire to attract female talent may be a legitimate reason for shaping generous paid 
family leave policies for female employees, a male plaintiff may still obtain relief if he shows that 
gender bias motivated the employer’s decision in crafting its policy. 
The Supreme Court did not rule on how an employee must prove an employer made its decision 
based on gender stereotypes. 99  This leaves many possibilities open for male plaintiffs in actions 
against their employers under Title VII. 
Millennials will make up three quarters of the workforce in America in the next decade.100  
Millennials highly value parental leave and other kinds of flexibility in the workplace.101  Equality 
in parental leave is a gender-neutral issue, especially because seventy-eight percent of millennials 
are in relationships where each partner has his or her own career.102  The idea that both parents 
will work as well as assume a caregiving role is increasingly prevalent.103  Policies constructed on 
archaic stereotypes, that women are caregivers and men are breadwinners, will be rejected by the 
next generation of employees.104  Such policies stand in the way of an increasing number of 
employees who wish to pursue a career as well as share equal caregiving responsibilities with their 
 
99 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251–52.  
100 Hilary Rau & Joan C. Williams, A Winning Parental Leave Policy Can Be Surprisingly Simple, HARVARD 







partners.105  It is not only in the employees’ best interest, but also in the employer’s best interest 
to craft policies that will appeal to the new generation in order to attract the highest talent to their 
companies.  Perhaps the market will naturally provide a remedy for male employees in the near 
future. 
Employers increasingly advertise generous paid parental leave policies to attract talented 
employees, yet they are less generous when it comes to men.106  Policies that require proof of being 
the primary caregiver to obtain maximum family leave benefits while assuming women are 
primary caregiver, or policies that only allow birth mothers to qualify as the “primary caregiver” 
for the purpose of such benefits, actually perpetuate stereotypical, archaic gender roles.107  This is 
a way that male plaintiffs can successfully sue for sex discrimination regarding discriminatory paid 
parental leave policies.  Under Title VII, as well as equal protection, discriminating against an 
employee for failing to conform to gender stereotypes is actionable as sex discrimination.108 
IV. Unique Male Challenges: Do Male Stereotypes Exist? 
For male plaintiffs to prevail under Title VII claims, FMLA claims, and equal protection claims, 
courts must recognize gender stereotypes exist against men.109  Men face more challenges than 
women to win cases under Title VII because courts find discrimination against women for failure 
to conform to gender stereotypes but fail to recognize discrimination against men under similar 
circumstances.110 
In Ayanna v. Dechert, the plaintiff was fired after taking leave to care for his mentally ill wife 
and newborn child, yet the district court dismissed his sex discrimination claim.111  The court 
 
105 Id. 
106 Rau & Williams, supra note 100. 
107 Rau & Williams, supra note 100. 
108 Bornstein, supra note 48, at 1315. 
109 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 34, at 269.   
110 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 34, at 268–69. 
111 Ayanna v. Dechert, LLP, 914 F. Supp. 2d 51, 57 (D. Mass. 2012). 
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concluded that, because female employees faced similar discipline, the plaintiff was fired for his 
status as a caregiver and not because of his gender and therefore found for the employer on this 
issue.112  The court analyzed the plaintiff’s claim in relation to how women at the firm were treated, 
which prevented the court from reaching the issue about whether the plaintiff was penalized for 
his failure to conform to the “macho” culture at the firm where other men “bragged about how 
little time they spent with their families.”113  It has been argued that although male and female 
employees face a similar impact, like being terminated from a position, the reasons behind the 
impact may be distinct for each gender and the court should examine the gender stereotypes the 
specific plaintiff faced.114  The argument follows that the Ayana court failed to examine the 
stereotypes that applied to the male plaintiff specifically when it consolidated male and female 
caregivers into one group.115 
In Marchioli v. Garland Co., the plaintiff was fired after notifying his boss about his 
girlfriend’s pregnancy and taking an afternoon off in order to help her select a physician.116  The 
plaintiff’s boss wrote him an evaluation stating he was concerned with his family obligations and 
that he was “not going to tolerate working with a guy who does not give it his all.”117  He fired the 
plaintiff despite his having reached one-hundred percent of his sales quota.118  In finding that the 
plaintiff was fired for his status as a parent rather than on the basis of his gender, the court once 
again—as in Ayanna—failed to recognize that the plaintiff was penalized for failing to conform to 
a gender stereotype that a man is expected to prioritize his job over family-care responsibilities.119  
 
112 Id. at 56–57. 
113 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 34, at 267.   
114 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 34, at 266. 
115 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 34, at 267. 
116 Marchioli v. Garland Co., No. 5:11-cv-124, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54227, *2–4 (N.D.N.Y. May 20, 2011). 
117 Id. at *3. 
118 Id. at *4. 
119 Id. at *14; see also Ayana, 914 F.Supp. 2d at 53.  
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The boss’s evaluation showed the plaintiff was being punished because he broke away from an 
expected male gender role by taking time to help with family obligations.120  One analysis of this 
case posits that the specific instance that triggered the employer’s dissatisfaction with the plaintiff 
was his request to take time off to accompany his girlfriend to a doctor’s appointment, which 
focused on his failure to conform to a gender role rather than status as a parent.121  If male plaintiffs 
are to succeed on Title VII sex discrimination claims, courts must analyze the gender stereotypes 
men are being held to despite similar impacts on women.   
Understanding how male stereotypes are created is essential to aid courts in recognizing and 
combatting them.  Male gender roles are created through social construction.122  Men constantly 
compete for the top place in the social hierarchy by denigrating what they view as non-dominant 
behavior in other men.123  Men measure their masculinity by contrasting their behavior to women 
and less dominant men; so, to prove masculinity, men will behave in certain ways to negate traits 
of less dominant men.124  “Hegemonic masculinity,” which puts men in a perpetual cycle of 
constantly proving their dominance, resulted in deeply rooted gender stereotypes that today 
continue to cause men to be frowned upon at work when they assume caregiving roles.125 
In order for men to succeed on sex discrimination claims in parental leave policies, courts must 
become aware of this dynamic so that they can recognize when a man is being punished for 
deviating from this cycle.  Men are punished for not conforming to their gender expectations when 
they wish to assume a caregiver role but are denied that right because employers construct parental 
 
120 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 34 at 268 (“Marchioli was not discriminated against because he was a ‘parent-
to-be’ but because he was a man trying to step outside the gendered expectation that obligates ‘real’ men to avoid 
caring for their pregnant girlfriends.”) 
121 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 34, at 268. 
122 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 34, at 271. 
123 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 34, at 273–74. 
124 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 34, at 274. 
125 Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 34, at 273.  
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leave policies based on deeply rooted gender stereotypes.  Due to the current state of the law as 
described above in cases like Ayanna and Marchioli, the main challenge male plaintiffs will face 
is convincing courts to explicitly identify and accept that male stereotypes exist in the workplace, 
so that men have the opportunity show that they are not being permitted to part from these norms. 
V. The FMLA and Gender Stereotyping  
A. FMLA Background  
The Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) applies to employers with fifty or more 
employees for twenty or more calendar weeks during the year.126  The FMLA provides covered 
employees with twelve weeks of unpaid job-protected leave per year for full-time employees due 
to: (1) the birth of an employee’s child; (2) the placement of a child through adoption or foster care 
with an employee; (3) the need for the employee to care for a spouse, child, or parent who has a 
serious health issue; (4) a serious health condition impeding the employee from his or her ability 
to perform their work-related duties; or (5) special circumstances where an employee’s spouse, 
child, or parent is on covered active duty or has been notified of covered active duty in the army.127  
An employee who takes leave due to one of the listed categories is entitled to return to his or her 
position or an equivalent with similar pay and benefits.128  Congress passed the FMLA in 1993 in 
order to allow employees to balance time between their work and home life.129 
B. Hibbs Discussion 
Although discussing the FMLA may seem superfluous since this comment concerns paid 
parental leave, the Supreme Court’s discussion of gender stereotyping in the influential Nevada 
 
126 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (2018). 
127 Id. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(E). 
128 Id. § 2614(a)(1)(A)-(B). 
129 Gerald Mayer, The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA): An Overview, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
1 (Sept. 28, 2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42758.pdf. 
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Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs case is important for framing potential male plaintiffs’ arguments 
under Title VII.  Hibbs reflects the Supreme Court’s adoption of gender stereotyping as a cause 
for sex discrimination claims under the FMLA as it did under equal protection and Title VII.   
In Hibbs, the plaintiff was granted twelve weeks leave from his government job under the 
FMLA to care for his wife who was recovering from neck injuries she sustained in a car accident.130  
After the plaintiff failed to return to work when his leave expired, his employer fired him.131  In 
holding that states could be sued for damages for violations of the FMLA, the Court used evidence 
of states’ use of discriminatory gender stereotypes in family leave policies to demonstrate that the 
Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to waive states’ sovereign immunity under the 
FMLA as a means of ensuring equal protection of the law.132   
The Court articulated that laws based on gender classifications are subject to heightened 
scrutiny, meaning that laws based on gender must be “substantially related” to an “important 
governmental objective[].”133  States’ justification for gender classifications may not be based on 
“overbroad generalizations” about the genders.134  The Court upheld Congress’s use of the FMLA 
to abrogate State sovereign immunity in Hibbs because evidence before Congress at the time the 
law was enacted showed that States relied on “invalid gender stereotypes in the employment 
context, specifically in the administration of leave benefits.” 135   Evidence of the States’ 
unconstitutional classifications justified Congress’s use of its section five Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement power.136  The Court reached the opposite conclusion in Coleman v. Court of Appeals 
 
130 Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 725 (2003). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 731. 
133 Id. at 728–29. 
134 Id. at 729. 
135 Id. at 730. 
136 Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 at 730. 
 21 
regarding abrogation of State sovereign immunity pursuant to the FMLA self-care provision.137  
The Court rejected Congress’s abrogation of State sovereign immunity in Coleman because of a 
lack of evidence showing the existence of facially discriminatory State self-care leave policies or 
that States applied self-care leave policies in a discriminatory manner.138  In Coleman, the Court 
found that Congress failed to justify its exercise of section five enforcement power since it lacked 
evidence of State constitutional violations.139 
When the Hibbs Court recognized that it was discriminatory to use gender stereotypes to treat 
men and women differently in the family leave context, it adopted the same framework for the 
FMLA that it established under equal protection and Title VII.  In justifying negating sovereign 
immunity, the Court cited facts from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to show that before the FMLA 
was enacted, gender stereotypes about caregiving “remained firmly rooted” and that states relied 
on these stereotypes to continue implementing parental leave policies that favored mothers.140  
Such policies, the Court pronounced, “were not attributable to any differential physical needs of 
men and women, but rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is 
women’s work.”141  Congress saw this disparity as an issue that required it to intervene.  The same 
logic should apply to paid parental leave.  If it is discriminatory to provide females with more 
unpaid family leave than men based on gender stereotypes, then it should be equally—if not 
more—wrong to do so in the paid family leave context, since one gender would not only be 
benefitting from additional time, but also additional compensation. 
 
137 Coleman v. Court of Appeals, 566 U.S. 30, 33 (2012). 
138 Id. at 38.  
139 Id. at 39. 
140 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730.  In 1990, the Bureau of Labor Statistics found that thirty-seven percent of private 
employees had access to maternity leave policies, but only eighteen percent had access to paternity leave.  Id. In 
1989, the Bureau of Labor Statistics found that thirty-three percent of private employees had access to maternity 
leave, whereas sixteen percent had access to paternity leave.  Id.  The Supreme Court noted that although the 
percentage of employees who had access to paternity leave increased, the gender gap also increased.  Id. 
141 Id. at 731. 
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Male plaintiffs should use the Supreme Court’s logic in Hibbs and apply it to arguments that 
paid family leave policies that treat men differently based on assumed gender stereotypes are 
discriminatory.  Paid parental leave policies that grant women additional leave for reasons other 
than physical disability arising from childbirth are, as the policies cited in Hibbs, also based on 
stereotypes that assume it is the woman’s role to be a caregiver and a man’s role to be the 
breadwinner.  Such stereotypes cause fathers to be denied equal benefits afforded to their 
counterparts.   
VI. EEOC Enforcement Guidelines: Caregiver Discrimination 
Title VII created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)142 with authority 
to enforce Title VII against discrimination in the workplace.143  The EEOC’s responsibilities 
include investigating allegations of discrimination against employers covered by Title VII.144  
After an investigation, if the EEOC makes a finding that the allegations of discrimination are true, 
then it will attempt to settle the claim.145  If a settlement cannot be reached, the EEOC may file a 
lawsuit to further its mission of preventing and combatting unlawful employment discrimination 
and will pursue litigation in some cases.146  In addition to its capacity to sue, the EEOC provides 
guidelines explaining the agency’s policies and how the law applies in the workplace.147  EEOC 
 
142 EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/milestones/1964.html. 




147 EEOC, What You Should Know About EEOC Regulations, Subregulatory Guidance and Other Resource 
Documents, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/regulations_guidance_resources.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 
2019). 
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guidelines are not binding in court; however, they do receive judicial deference if they are 
reasonable.148  A court may adopt the EEOC’s position if it finds the position persuasive.149 
The EEOC explicitly advocates for broadening protection for male caregivers against 
discrimination based on gender stereotypes.150  The EEOC relies on Hibbs to support its reasoning 
that denying men equal employment benefits violates equal employment opportunity federal law, 
not just the FMLA, because “[m]ale caregivers may face the mirror image stereotype: that men are 
poorly suited to caregiving. As a result, men may be denied parental leave or other benefits 
routinely afforded their female counterparts.”151  The EEOC recognizes that although female 
workers have historically suffered from gender stereotypes in the workplace, “unlawful 
assumptions about working fathers . . . have sometimes led employers to deny male employees 
opportunities that have been provided to working women . . . .” and such unequal treatment, 
according to the EEOC, explicitly violates Title VII.152  The EEOC concludes that employment 
decisions based on gender stereotypes, including distribution of employment benefits, violate 
federal antidiscrimination law whether or not the employer was consciously motivated by those 
stereotypes.153 
 
148 Id. (“EEOC subregulatory guidance documents interpreting a ‘legislative regulation’ (under the ADEA, ADA, or 
GINA) receive deference from the courts if reasonable.”); see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 
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As an example of illegal discrimination against a male caregiver based on gender stereotypes, 
the EEOC relies on Knussman v. Maryland, an equal protection case.154  In Knussman, the plaintiff 
employee requested additional sick leave as the “primary caregiver” following his wife’s 
complicated delivery of their daughter, which left his wife recovering from a serious medical 
condition.155  Despite providing a letter from a physician explaining his wife’s medical condition, 
the defendant employer denied the plaintiff’s request for additional leave.156  The employer told 
the plaintiff that the mother was presumed to be the primary caregiver.157  The court concluded 
that the presumption against the plaintiff that the mother was the primary caregiver constituted an 
equal protection violation.158   
Based on the EEOC’s guidance and examples, it follows that paid parental leave policies 
discriminate by assuming females are primary caregivers and fathers are secondary caregivers.  
Although the EEOC’s guideline is not binding, it may still be persuasive to a court especially since 
equal protection, FMLA, and Title VII jurisprudence reflect the EEOC’s position.   
The EEOC views Title VII as permitting employers to provide female caregivers with 
disability leave due to medical conditions associated with pregnancy and childbirth, but they may 
not provide unequal leave for childcare purposes.159  Therefore, in order to avoid Title VII liability, 
employers should be careful to ensure additional leave granted to females for parental leave is 
explicitly for disability.  One of the allegations in the case against Jones Day is that although the 
parental leave policy granted women an additional eight weeks for disability leave, it did not 
require proof of disability; and as allegedly admitted by the Human Resources Department, the 
 
154 Id. at n.34. 
155 Knussman v. Maryland, 16 F. Supp. 2d 601, 606 (D. Md. 1998). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 612.  The liability for the equal protection violation was upheld by the 4th Circuit, but was remanded to 
recalculate the damages.  Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001). 
159 EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 151. 
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time was often used even when female employees were not incapacitated due to medical conditions 
following birth. 160   To avoid liability, parental leave policies should provide new mothers 
additional disability leave, but only upon proof of disability.  This is important because providing 
mothers with additional leave unrelated to physical recovery from childbirth without offering the 
same to men is discriminatory according to the EEOC.161  Denying fathers parental leave where it 
would be granted to a mother under the same circumstances constitutes disparate treatment and 
violates federal equal employment opportunities law.162 
VII. Implications of Title VII Parental Leave Case Law 
A. Guerra Discussion  
In Guerra, the plaintiff employer challenged a California statute that required covered 
employers to provide four months of unpaid, job-protected, pregnancy disability leave.163  In this 
case, a receptionist working for a company took pregnancy disability leave, during which the 
company filled her position, leaving no similar positions available upon her return.164  The district 
court entered a judgment in favor of the employer, one of the grounds being that the state statute 
would subject employers to reverse discrimination suits by disabled males who did not receive 
equal benefits to pregnant females.165  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, stating that 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), which amends Title VII to provide that discrimination 
based on pregnancy is sex discrimination,166 was enacted “to construct a floor beneath which 
 
160 Jones Day Complaint at 19. 
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pregnancy disability benefits may not drop -- not a ceiling above which they may not rise.”167  In 
addition, the Court of Appeals found that California statute was not preempted by Title VII because 
it was consistent rather than conflicting with the federal law, since its aim was to enhance equal 
employment opportunities for women.168   
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and its reasoning.169  In addition, the 
Court found that employers could comply with both Title VII and the California statute by 
providing other disabled employees the same benefits the state requires the employer to provide 
for pregnancy disability.170  The outcome of this case is surprising.  The holding that Title VII 
allows preferential treatment towards pregnancy disability leave conflicts with Title VII itself.  
Justice White’s dissent in Guerra stated that the PDA “mandates that pregnant employees ‘shall 
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes’ as nonpregnant employees similarly 
situated with respect to their ability or inability to work.” 171  The way Justice White saw it, the 
PDA does not leave space for providing preferential treatment for pregnant employees.172  Justice 
White therefore concluded that the PDA preempted the California law because the California law 
would require an employer to provide certain disability leave for pregnancy but not the same for 
other disabilities.173 
Guerra’s implication on paid parental leave policies permits some preferential treatment for 
pregnant workers; it is the strongest basis for the validity of the Jones Day and similar policies.  
Employers, however, should be careful in relying on it since no threshold exists regarding how far 
preferential treatment can go before it leads to actionable discrimination. 
 
167 Guerra, 749 U.S. at 280. 
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171 Id. at 297 (White, J., dissenting). 
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173 Guerra, 749 U.S. at 298. 
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B. Johnson Discussion 
1. Parental Leave Benefits for Similarly Situated Employees   
In Johnson v. Univ. of Iowa, the parental leave policy in question provided that biological 
mothers were entitled to use accrued paid sick leave following the birth of a child.174  The plaintiff, 
a male employee, attended a class that outlined the employer’s parental leave policy and was told 
that biological fathers were not entitled to use accrued sick leave following the birth of a child.175  
The plaintiff made a two-prong argument.176  First, he contended that the employer’s policy was 
facially discriminatory because it allowed mothers to use accrued sick leave following the birth of 
child but denied biological fathers the same benefit.177  Second, the plaintiff argued that his 
employer applied the policy in a discriminatory manner by allowing his wife—who was also an 
employee—to use accrued sick leave for “caregiving,” while denying his request to do so.178 
The plaintiff relied on two premises to demonstrate that the policy was facially discriminatory.  
He first cited the introduction to the policy, which stated its purpose was to “‘permit parents who 
have care giving responsibilities to have time off to spend with a child newly added to the 
family . . . .’”179 (emphasis added).  In addition, the plaintiff cited the Informational Guide provided 
by his employer to explain how its policy applied, which stated “‘leave is for the biological mother 
to recover from childbirth and to spend time with the newborn child’” (emphasis added).180  
Although the court found that the policy was not facially discriminatory due to the language that 
actually gave the benefit, Judge Melloy noted that both the Eighth Circuit and the district court 
 
174 Johnson v. Univ. of Iowa, 431 F.3d 325, 327 (8th Cir. 2005).  
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were “troubled” because the description of how the policy was supposed to operate contradicted 
its facial language.181 
The court correctly found the policy was not applied in a discriminatory manner, but solely on 
the premise that the plaintiff and his wife were not similarly situated employees.182  In this case, 
the plaintiff and his wife were not similarly situated because he worked full-time and she worked 
part-time and it is generally accepted that full-time and part-time employees are not considered to 
be similarly situated.183  On this basis, the court concluded that even if the employer granted the 
plaintiff’s wife time for child bonding without granting the same to plaintiff, the employer would 
prevail because they were not similarly situated.184 
According to the Eighth Circuit, under different facts, the outcome would have to be different.  
In Johnson, the court stated that leave granted due to physical disability following childbirth is a 
“valid reason wholly separate from gender,” whereas if leave is given to the biological mother for 
the purpose of childcare and bonding with a new child, then denying the same benefit to a 
biological father is not justified.185  Consider this hypothetical: Mary and Sam Smith are both full-
time employees at a hospital and they are expecting the birth of their child.  The hospital has an 
identical policy to the one in Johnson.  As in the case against Jones Day, Sam and Mary are 
similarly situated because both are full-time employees of the same hospital.  Granting Mary 
enhanced benefits in the form of using accrued paid sick leave regardless of whether or not she 
was incapacitated following childbirth essentially allows Mary to enjoy paid leave for childcare 
and bonding, which is discriminatory against Sam who was denied the same. 
 
181 Id. at 329 n.3. 
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A policy like the one in Johnson would have to be found discriminatory if the male plaintiff 
was being compared to another full-time female employee.  The plaintiff in Johnson instead should 
have demonstrated that another full-time female employee was granted the same leave as the 
plaintiff’s wife, which exceeded the length of her disability, in order to show he was discriminated 
against on the basis of sex.  In challenging paid parental leave policies, male plaintiffs should 
ensure that they compare the policy as applied to similarly situated female employees in order to 
succeed on their claims. 
2. Is Presumption the Problem? Six Weeks Presumed Disability Following Childbirth 
In Johnson, the court found that a presumption of six weeks of disability following the birth of 
a child is supported by medical evidence.186  This is important because in the Jones Day case, the 
policy presumed eight weeks of disability.187  To succeed in its case, Jones Day will likely have to 
submit medical evidence that demonstrates eight weeks of disability is supported, rather than six.  
On the other hand, the plaintiffs will likely try to show that women typically recover from birth in 
less time, at least if the work involved is not physically demanding.  The purpose of the plaintiff’s 
argument in Johnson, that six weeks of disability leave was not truly for disability, is that his wife 
was able to recover in four weeks and she was then able to use the remainder of that time to bond 
with the child.188  It follows that if female employees are granted paid disability leave for longer 
than they are incapacitated, then the remaining time is really for child bonding and denying the 
equivalent to biological fathers would be discriminatory. 
 
186 Johnson, 431 F.3d at 329. 
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The outcome of Johnson conflicts with the EEOC guidelines.  If women typically recover in 
less than six weeks, then any additional time mothers are given without being incapacitated 
violates Title VII, and policies that presume disability are discriminatory.  The problem is the 
presumption.  If female employees are actually disabled, the extended leave is justified.  But 
policies that automatically give such a large period of time off are arguably discriminatory.  Instead, 
employers ought to require a doctor’s note or proof through medical records that such a disability 
period is necessary.  Although such a requirement may pose an obstacle for large employers 
managing hundreds of employees, this is no less practical than obtaining proof of disability for 
other, non-pregnancy related conditions. 
3. A Lesson from Johnson: Alternative to Plaintiff’s Approach 
The plaintiff in Johnson should have made a different argument under Title VII.  He should 
have argued that based on the facial language of the policy “for spending time with new child” in 
the introduction and the manual, that this was gender stereotyping.  He should have argued that 
the policy, by giving female employees time to care for the child, assumed that men would not 
assume a caregiver role; the employer denied his request based on gender stereotyping; the policy 
itself was based on gender stereotyping; and, by denying the same leave to men the employer was 
discriminating against them for not conforming to the “role” they were expected to assume as the 
breadwinner. 
Johnson did not have to take issue with the presumption of disability; rather, the case could 
have been grounded in the policy’s facially discriminatory language that perpetuated male 
stereotypes.  Male plaintiffs should focus on the policy’s language and assumptions based on 
gender stereotypes. 
C. Esteé Lauder and JP Morgan Paid Parental Leave Settlements 
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1. Esteé Lauder 
On July 17, 2018 Esteé Lauder settled a case for $1.1 million in a lawsuit filed by the EEOC 
alleging sex discrimination on behalf of male employees for its unequal paid parental leave 
policy.189  The EEOC alleged that the company discriminated against 210 male employees by 
providing less paid leave for child bonding with a newborn child or adopted child than it did for 
female employees.190  The policy at issue was not part of the medical leave granted to mothers for 
childbirth.191  Male employees were also denied “return-to-work” benefits that female employees 
were entitled to, such as temporary modified work schedules upon return from paid parental 
leave.192  The company’s parental leave policy provided two weeks paid leave for new fathers and 
six weeks paid leave for mothers for the purpose of bonding with the newborn after their medical 
leave ended.193  Part of the settlement required the company to implement an equal parental leave 
policy.194  The new policy now provides twenty weeks paid leave, regardless of gender and 
caregiver status, for child bonding.195  Both genders also will receive a six-week modified work 
schedule when returning from leave.196  For mothers, their bonding leave begins once their medical 
leave ends.197  In response to the settlement, Thomas Rethage, a Senior Trial Attorney at the 
EEOC’s Philadelphia District Office stated, “[p]arental leave policies should not reflect 
presumptions or stereotypes about gender roles. When it comes to paid leave for bonding with a 
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new child or flexibility in returning to work from that leave, mothers and fathers should be treated 
equally. . .”198 
The EEOC’s complaint against Esteé Lauder stated that the company provided biological 
fathers with secondary caregiver leave.199  When an employee wanted to use his parental leave 
benefits he had to contact the Disability Management Team (“Team”) who would then send the 
appropriate forms and advise the him on the type of leave he qualified for.200  The Team would 
notify biological fathers to fill out secondary caregiver paperwork.201  The male employee who 
brought the Esteé Lauder case to the EEOC notified the company of his intent to take primary 
caregiver leave. 202  The Team informed him that as a biological father he was only eligible for 
secondary caregiver leave.203  The EEOC stated that the company’s practices, “which discriminate 
based on sex against aggrieved individuals by affording such individuals lesser paid parental leave 
and transition back-to-work benefits than are afforded eligible female employees who are 
biological mothers” are unlawful.204 
Although settlements may occur for reasons unrelated to the merits of a case, the EEOC’s 
approach is pertinent in that it represents the most recent look into how advocates of workplace 
equality view distinctions between primary and secondary caregivers, which is a prevalent practice 
in paid family leave policies.  
2. JP Morgan  
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In May, 2019, The ACLU settled a class action against JP Morgan, where JP Morgan agreed 
to pay $5 million to male employees who were unlawfully denied primary caregiver leave from 
2011 to 2017.205  The plaintiff who brought the case, Mr. Rotondo, requested fourteen weeks of 
paid parental leave as the primary caregiver after the birth of his son.206  The JP Morgan human 
resources department told him that mothers were presumptively the primary caregivers and could 
receive up to sixteen weeks of paid leave.207  Fathers could only receive two weeks of paid leave, 
unless they could demonstrate their spouse was incapacitated and could no longer care for the child 
or is working.208  In June 2017, the ACLU and law firm Outten & Golden LLP, filed a charge on 
behalf of Mr. Rotondo with the EEOC arguing that JP Morgan’s parental leave policy violated 
Title VII.209  Following the charge, JP Morgan granted Mr. Rotondo the full sixteen weeks of 
primary caregiver leave.210  Mr. Rotondo brought the subsequent class action to obtain relief for 
other JP Morgan male employees who suffered because of the policy.211 
The original June 2017 EEOC Charge set out the complaint against JP Morgan for denying 
equal parental leave to biological fathers on the basis of sex based stereotypes.212  It argued that 
the policy discriminates because it  
rel[ies] upon and enforce[s] a sex-based stereotype that women are or should be caretakers of 
children, and that women do or should remain at home to care for a child following the child’s 
birth, while men are not or should not be caretakers and instead men do or should return to 
work shortly after the birth of a child.213   
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In the later class action settlement, the plaintiffs cited Hibbs among other cases to support their 
argument. 214   The plaintiffs argued that JP Morgan’s treatment of fathers “rests upon 
impermissible sex-based stereotypes about men’s role as breadwinners and women’s role as 
caregivers, thus violating Title VII and parallel state antidiscrimination laws.”215  
Once again, cases settle for many reasons unrelated to the merits, but it is important to look at 
the arguments current plaintiffs are putting forward.  Current plaintiffs, as shown in both the Esteé 
Lauder and J.P. Morgan settlements, are taking an alternative course of action to the plaintiff in 
Johnson, focusing on the gender stereotyping argument to challenge such unequal paid parental 
leave policies rather than the time that women are granted for disability following childbirth.  If 
the plaintiffs in the Jones Day case succeed, it will likely be on the grounds of gender stereotyping 
rather than presumption of disability leave. 
VIII. Conclusion 
Male plaintiffs challenging unequal paid parental leave policies should use sex-based gender 
stereotyping framework under Title VII.  The major challenge plaintiffs will face using such a 
framework is establishing male gender generalizations for a court to recognize and overcome.  If 
men use this framework to challenge parental leave policies, they will pave the road for future 
male plaintiffs—they will be the catalyst for change. 
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